Revocable Certificateless Public Key Encryption with Equality Test

Authors

  • Tung-Tso Tsai National Taiwan Ocean University, Department of computer science and engineering
  • Han-Yu Lin Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University
  • Han-Ching Tsai Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.51.4.30691

Keywords:

Revocable, Certificateless, Equality test, Public key encryption, Bilinear pairing

Abstract

Traditional public key cryptography requires certificates as a link between each user’s identity and her/his public key. Typically, public key infrastructures (PKI) are used to manage and maintain certificates. However, it takes a lot of resources to build PKI which includes many roles and complex policies. The concept of certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKC) was introduced to eliminate the need for certificates. Based on this concept, a mechanism called certificateless public key encryption with equality test (CL-PKEET) was proposed to ensure the confidentiality of private data and provide an equality test of different ciphertexts. The mechanism is suitable for cloud applications where users cannot only protect personal private data but also enjoy cloud services which test the equality of different ciphertexts. More specifically, any two ciphertexts can be tested to determine whether they are encrypted from the same plaintext. Indeed, any practical system needs to provide a solution to revoke compromised users. However, these existing CL-PKEET schemes do not address the revocation problem, and the related research is scant. Therefore, the aim of this article is to propose the first revocable CL-PKEET scheme called RCL-PKEET which can effectively remove illegal users from the system while maintaining the effectiveness of existing CL-PKEET schemes in encryption, decryption, and equality testing processes. Additionally, we formally demonstrate the security of the proposed scheme under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Author Biographies

Tung-Tso Tsai, National Taiwan Ocean University, Department of computer science and engineering

Tung-Tso Tsai is currently an assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University, Taiwan. His research interests include applied cryptography, pairing-based cryptography and leakage-resilient cryptography. He received the Ph.D. degree from the Department of Mathematics, National Changhua University of Education, Taiwan, in 2014, under the supervision of Professor Yuh-Min Tseng.

Han-Yu Lin, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University

Han-Yu Lin received the B.A. degree in economics from the Fu-Jen University, New Taipei City, Taiwan, in June 2001, the M.S. degree in information management from the Huafan University, New Taipei City, Taiwan, in June 2003, and the Ph.D. degree in computer science and engineering from the National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan, in December 2010. He was a Research Assistant with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University, Keelung, Taiwan, R.O.C., in 2011. He was a Senior Engineer with the CyberTrust Technology Institute, Institute for Information Industry, Taipei, Taiwan, in 2012. Currently, he is a Professor with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University. His research interests include cryptology, network security, digital forensics, RFID privacy and application, cloud computing security, and e-commerce security.

Han-Ching Tsai, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University

Han-Ching Tsai received the M.S. degrees from the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Taiwan Ocean University, Taiwan, in 2022. Her research interests include pairing-based cryptography and information security.

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Published

2022-12-12

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Section

Articles