On Security of a Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Conjunctive Field Keyword Search Scheme

  • Yang Lu College of Computer and Information Engineering, Hohai University
  • Gang Wang College of Computer and Information Engineering, Hohai University
  • Jiguo Li College of Computer and Information Engineering, Hohai University
Keywords: public key encryption, conjunctive field keyword search, secure channel free, keyword guessing attack

Abstract

Public key encryption with keyword search is a practical cryptographic paradigm that enables one to search the encrypted keyword without compromising the security of the original data. Recently, Hwang et al. proposed a secure channel free public key encryption with conjunctive field keyword search (SCF-PECKS) scheme and claimed that their scheme can withstand the keyword guessing attack and does not require the secure channel. In this paper, by presenting three concrete attacks, we demonstrate that Hwang et al.’s SCF-PECKS scheme fails to achieve security against keyword guessing attacks by either the outsider attackers or the malicious insider servers. The presented attacks show that Hwang et al.’s SCF-PECKS scheme is vulnerable to the keyword guessing attack regardless whether the trapdoor is sent in public or secure channel. Therefore, devising a secure SCF-PECKS scheme remains an unsolved problem until now.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.47.1.16137

Author Biography

Yang Lu, College of Computer and Information Engineering, Hohai University
Yang Lu received the Ph.D. degree from PLA University of Science and Technology in 2009. He has been working in HoHai University from 2003. Currently, he is an Assistant Professor in College of Computer and Information Engineering. His major research interests include information security and public key cryptography, network security and cloud security, etc. He has published more than 40 scientific papers in international conferences and journals.
Published
2018-02-05
Section
Articles